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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the effects of the financial crisis continue to unravel before us, it is 
ever more apparent how interlinked our economies are throughout the 
world, and regulators have become increasingly concerned regarding 
corruption that is international in scope.  Huge amounts of money are being 
shifted and transferred every day, often through multiple borders and 
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jurisdictions.  Regulatory authorities are realizing that they must cross their 
borders to pursue enforcement actions; the ―post-financial crisis‖ 
jurisdiction is the globe.  And in particular, securities enforcement trends 
post-financial crisis show that regulatory authorities worldwide have 
almost universally agreed to coordinate and cooperate with each other as 
they pursue enforcement actions.  The financial crisis has brought to the 
forefront various regulators that are speaking out for greater cross-border 
cooperation and a more robust, collaborative oversight of the world‘s 
financial system.  Time will tell where that leads. 
Regulators, in part shocked into action by the global nature of the 
financial crisis, have recently started to make increased efforts to combat 
corruption and bribery at a global level.  Authorities in the United States 
and throughout the world have almost universally articulated a need for 
heightened international cooperation in the last few years.  The Securities 
and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖), the United States Treasury, and the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (―OECD‖), 
among others, have set the tone for new principles. With the goal of more 
effective supervision of global markets, they are pursuing a common 
agenda.  For example, regulators and other authorities or organizations 
have realized that the ―economies struggled to recover from a global 
economic and financial crisis that was closely linked to questions of 
honesty, propriety and transparency in business conduct.‖
1
  Chairman of 
the SEC, Mary Schapiro, testifying before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in 2009, explained that the financial 
crisis has demonstrated how ―traditional processes evolved into 
questionable business practices, that, when combined with leverage and 
global markets, created extensive systemic risk.‖
2
  She then articulated a 
need for ―active enforcement that serves as a ready reminder‖ of the rules 
and ―why we need [the rules] to protect consumers, investors, and 
taxpayers—and . . . the system itself.‖
3
  Also in 2009, SEC Commissioner 
Luis Aguilar said, ―As the recent financial crisis has demonstrated, 
misconduct can have a global effect.  As a result, international cooperation 
in combating fraud is more crucial than ever before.‖
4
  Similarly, SEC 
Commissioner Kathleen Casey stated that the financial crisis has ―shaken 
 
 1. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. Working Group on Bribery (―OECD Working 
Group‖), 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2010) [hereinafter OECD Working Group, 2009 
ANNUAL REPORT], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/45460981.pdf. 
 2. Establishing a Framework for Systematic Risk Regulation:  Hearing before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Mary L. 
Schapiro, Chairman, SEC), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts072309mls.htm. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm‘r, SEC, Speech at the Third Annual Fraud and Forensic 
Accounting Education Conference:  Combating Securities Fraud at Home and Abroad (May 
28, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052809laa.htm. 
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the foundations of our markets, and acutely demonstrated their truly 
interdependent and connected nature . . . trigger[ing] a fundamental 
rethinking of the adequacy of regulatory supervision at both the national 
and international levels.‖
5
  At the United States Department of Treasury, 
Under Secretary Lael Brainard remarked in 2010:  ―America . . . cannot act 
alone.  Other nations must also undertake the difficult reforms required to 
rebalance global growth as well as to strengthen their own economies.‖
6
  
Although regulators have recognized the need to engage in international 
cooperation to combat corruption and bribery at a global level, it remains to 
be seen if this understanding will lead to a meaningful transformation in the 
area of enforcement. 
II.  RECENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CROSS-BORDER 
ENFORCEMENT 
A.  Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
In response to the financial crisis, international and national bodies 
have placed the issues surrounding global corruption near the top of their 
agendas.  Through its Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, the OECD, for example, 
attempts to reign in corruption in global business practices with standards 
criminalizing bribery of foreign public officials in international business 
transactions.
7
  On June 15, 2010, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions (―OECD Working Group‖) released an 
Annual Report indicating the progress made by its thirty-eight signatories 
(including thirty-three OECD members and five other countries) in the past 
year.
8
  Twenty-one parties to the Convention reported 280 ongoing 
investigations, with 150 of the investigations being conducted in one 
 
 5. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm‘r, SEC, Welcoming Remarks Before the 34th IOSCO 
Annual Conference (June 10, 2009), http://www.oceg.org/blog/welcoming-remarks-34th-
iosco-annual-conference. 
 6. Press Release, Lael Brainard, Under Sec‘y, U.S. Dep‘t of Treasury, Rebuilding 
Together: Europe and the United States after the Global Financial Crisis (Sept. 29, 2010), 
http://www.uspolicy.be/headline/us-official-us-europe-rebuilding-after-financial-crisis. 
 7. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. (―OECD‖), Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Transactions (2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf; see also OECD, Country Reports on the 
Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (Mar. 25, 2011, 2:27 PM), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,3n_2649_34859_1933144_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(providing country-by-country reports on the implementation of the convention). 
 8. OECD Working Group, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1; see also David A. 
Wilson, Leveling the Anti-Corruption Playing Field, LAW360 (July 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.law360.com/web/articles/180065 (discussing OECD‘s progress in combating 
bribery). 
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country.
9
  The Annual Report also highlights the challenges of changing the 
international business culture, where bribery is a common element and 
some governments are reluctant to enforce anti-bribery policies.
10
 
In November 2009, the OECD Working Group issued the Anti-
Bribery Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (―OECD Anti-Bribery 
Recommendation‖).
11
  It encourages signatories to cooperate with other 
countries to prosecute allegations of bribery, strengthen their whistleblower 
protections, and review policies on small facilitation payments, among 
other things.  The OECD also issued guidance called ―Good Practice 
Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance‖ (―OECD Good 
Practice Guidance‖), adopted on February 18, 2010.
12
  The OECD Good 
Practice Guidance asks the private sector to adopt clear anti-bribery 
policies, assume responsibility for the oversight of ethics and compliance 
programs, conduct regular training and communication programs on 
foreign bribery with employees and business partners, and implement 
disciplinary procedures for violations of anti-bribery rules.
13
  It also 
includes considerable emphasis on third-party compliance measures, such 
as a recommendation that companies institute measures to prevent foreign 
bribery with third parties such as agents and other intermediaries, 
consultants, representatives, distributors, contractors and suppliers, 
consortia, and joint venture partners.
14
  The OECD Working Group has 
implemented a peer review process to assess a signatory‘s implementation 
of the recommendations described above.
15
  The review process is intended 
to measure a country‘s enforcement and institutional mechanisms and 
review its legislation.  The OECD Good Practice Guidance is not legally 
binding; however, like the DOJ Sentencing Guidelines, it presents 
incentives and methodologies for adopting strong compliance programs,
16
 
and sets forth a global standard. 
The OECD Working Group has grown since the financial crisis.  In 
2009, Russia asked to join the Anti-Bribery Convention as part of the 
OECD membership drive.
17
  The OECD Working Group is also deepening 
 
 9. OECD Working Group, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1. 
 10. Id.  
 11. OECD Working Group in Int‘l Bus. Transactions, Recommendation of the Council 
for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/40/44176910.pdf. 
 12. OECD, Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance 
(Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/51/44884389.pdf. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. OECD Working Group, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
 16. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4 cmt. background (2010). 
 17. OECD Working Group, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. 
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relations on anti-bribery issues with China, India, Indonesia and Thailand 
through the exchange of information and official missions, and it aims to 
eventually offer memberships to these countries.
18
  In December 2009, the 
OECD Working Group launched a new three-year Initiative to Raise 
Global Awareness of Foreign Bribery.
19
  The three-year initiative includes 
plans for a global media outreach campaign, a ―Foreign Bribery Impact 
Study‖ of the harm caused by bribery, and the development of academic 
courses on foreign bribery for law and business schools.
20
  Also in 2009, 
the OECD Working Group strengthened its anti-corruption ties with the 
World Bank regarding the quantification of the proceeds of bribery and 
asset recovery.
21
 
On October 15, 2010, after conducting a review, the OECD Working 
Group commended United States regulators on their enforcement efforts.
22
  
OECD findings were summarized, in part, as follows: 
U.S. enforcement has increased steadily and resulted in 
increasingly significant prison sentences, monetary penalties and 
disgorgement.  Increased enforcement was enabled by the good 
practices developed within the U.S. legal and policy framework, 
including the dedication of resources to specialized units in the 
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.  New legislation has 
also strengthened accounting and auditing standards, including 
those introduced in the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
whistleblower protections under the July 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
23
 
Most recently, the OECD Working Group issued reports regarding 
anti-corruption measures in Iceland and the Ukraine.
24
  It concluded that 
 
 18. Id. at 33–36. 
 19. Id. at 12–13. 
 20. Id. at 13. 
 21. Id. at 45–46. 
 22. See OECD Directorate for Fin. and Enter. Affairs, United States:  Phase 3 Report 
on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions and the 2009 Revised Recommendation on combating 
Bribery in International Business Transactions (Oct. 15, 2010) (commenting on the visible 
and high level of support for the fight against bribery from the United States), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf. 
 23. Id. at 4. 
 24. OECD Directorate for Fin. and Enter. Affairs, Iceland:  Phase 3 : Report on the 
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions and the 2009 Revised Recommendation on Combating 
Bribery in International Business Transactions (Dec. 15, 2010) [hereinafter OECD,  
Iceland:  Phase 3], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/41/46861415.pdf; OECD Anti-
Corruption Network for Eastern and Central Asia, Second Round of Monitoring:  Ukraine 
Monitoring Report (Dec. 9, 2010) [hereinafter OECD ACN,  Ukraine Monitoring Report], 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/55/46832397.pdf. 
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Iceland must work to ensure its law enforcement authorities are 
coordinated and adequately resourced to investigate and prosecute 
economic crimes.
25
  Specifically, it recommended that Iceland should 
strengthen sanctions for foreign bribery offenses and ensure that private 
sector whistleblowers are adequately protected when reporting suspected 
acts of bribery.
26
  The OECD also concluded that the Ukraine had made 
little progress after the financial crisis, despite pledges from the country‘s 
leaders to take action.
27
  It recommended, among other things, that the 
Ukraine should ensure effective international mutual legal assistance in the 
investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, strengthen the public 
institutions responsible for combating corruption, and establish a dedicated 
anti-corruption investigative body with specialist prosecutors.
28
 
Strong United States support has accompanied the OECD‘s 
burgeoning efforts.  During his remarks to the OECD in May 2010 in Paris, 
Attorney General Eric Holder expressed concerted and ever-increasing 
United States support for the OECD and the Anti-Bribery Convention.
29
  
He said: 
For years, the OECD has been at the forefront of efforts to 
combat corruption wherever and however it occurs . . . . [N]one 
of the progress the United States has made would have been 
possible without the long-term cooperation of our law 
enforcement partners around the globe—cooperation fostered by 
relationships established through the OECD . . . . Every member 
of the Working Group, including the United States, can do more 
to engage in robust international cooperation.
30
 
Holder pointed out that one reason authorities should cooperate is 
because bribery takes a large toll on the economy.
31
  ―The World Bank 
estimates that more than one trillion dollars in bribes are paid each year out 
of a world economy of 30 trillion dollars.  That‘s a staggering three percent 
of the world‘s economy.  And the impact is particularly severe on foreign 
investment,‖ Holder told the OECD.
32
  In particular, the impact on 
developing countries, such as Bangladesh, where ―foreign bribery imposes 
huge costs on [the country] and also taints politics and democratic 
 
 25. OECD, Iceland:  Phase 3, supra note 24, at 4. 
 26. Id. 
 27. OECD ACN, Ukraine Monitoring Report, supra note 24, at 40. 
 28. Id. at 43–44. 
 29. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Holder Delivers Remarks at the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (May 31, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100531.html. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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governance,‖ can reportedly be devastating.
33
 
B.  G-20 Working Group on Anti-Corruption 
The OECD is not alone in bolstering its anti-bribery efforts and post-
financial crisis recommendations:  recently, the G-20 has taken on a 
leadership role as a forum to promote international economic cooperation.
34
  
In June 2010, at the G-20 Summit in Toronto, the G-20 announced the 
creation of a G-20 Working Group on Anti-Corruption (―WGAC‖) to 
examine and make recommendations regarding international cooperation to 
combat corruption.
35
  The G-20 mandated the WGAC to make 
recommendations on how the G-20 could continue to make practical and 
valuable contributions to international efforts to combat corruption.  The G-
20 now seeks to lead by example in key areas that include, but are not 
limited to, adopting and enforcing strong and effective anti-bribery rules, 
fighting corruption in the public and private sectors, preventing access of 
corrupt persons to global financial systems, cooperating in visa denial, 
extradition and asset recovery, and protecting whistleblowers from 
retaliation.
36
 
 These steps occurred in connection with the G-20‘s earlier directives 
to strengthen international standards and promote international cooperation 
among national regulators as a necessary outcome in current global 
financial markets.
37
  In November 2008, the G-20 leaders set forth five 
principles to guide policy implementation:  (1) strengthening transparency 
and accountability; (2) enhancing sound regulation; (3) promoting integrity 
in financial markets; (4) reinforcing international cooperation; and (5) 
reforming international financial institutions.
38
 
WGAC also achieved consensus on the idea of strengthening the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (―UNCAC‖).
39
  As a result, 
the G-20 called on all G-20 members to fully implement the UNCAC.  In 
September 2010, WGAC met in Jakarta and agreed on an action plan that 
 
 33. Transparency Int‘l, 2010 Progress Report:  Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention 76 (July 28, 2010), http://www.transparency.org/content/download/53670/ 
856410/file/2010+PROGRESS+REPORT.pdf. 
 34. John W. Head, The Global Financial Crisis of 2008–2009 in Context—Reflections 
on International Legal and Institutional Failings, ―Fixes,‖ and Fundamentals, 23 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 43, 56–62 (2010). 
 35. Press Release, Republic of Indonesia, G-20 Working Group on Anti-Corruption, 
Jakarta, 27–28 September 2010 (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/Press 
Release.aspx?IDP=1002&l=en [hereinafter Press Release, Republic of Indonesia]. 
 36. Id. 
 37. G-20, Declaration:  Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (Nov. 
15, 2008), http://www.g20.org/documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf. 
 38. Id at 3. 
 39. Press Release, Republic of Indonesia, supra note 35. 
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the G-20 leaders later endorsed at the G-20 Summit in Seoul, South Korea 
in November 2010.
40
  As WGAC developed the action plan, WGAC 
members bridged differences and reached consensus on its elements, such 
as (1) adopting and enforcing legal and other measures against international 
bribery; and (2) preventing corrupt officials from laundering their proceeds 
of corruption and accessing the global financial system.
41
 
The G-20 is encouraging all major economies to adopt the standards 
set forth in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.  Lastly, the leaders of the 
G-20 and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(―IOSCO‖) established the Financial Stability Board (―FSB‖) to monitor 
the progress of ―needed reforms.‖
42
  In a world without a global financial 
regulator, the FSB was mandated in April 2009 to serve as ―a mechanism 
for national authorities, standard setting bodies . . . and international 
financial institutions to address vulnerabilities and to develop and 
implement strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest 
of financial stability.‖
43
  In March 2010, the FSB launched an initiative to 
incentivize jurisdictions to engage in international cooperation and adhere 
to information exchange standards in the financial regulatory and 
supervisory area.
44
  The FSB is set to play an integral role in developing a 
framework for international cooperation throughout the global financial 
system.
45
 
C.  International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
Aside from its creation of the FSB with the G-20, IOSCO is also 
building a regulatory framework to combat cross-border market abuse.  On 
January 22, 2010, IOSCO announced that it achieved its 2005 goal of 
having its eligible membership sign onto, or commit to signing, the IOSCO 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding concerning Consultation, 
Cooperation, and the Exchange of Information (―MMoU‖).
46
  This 
achievement means that 96% of IOSCO‘s eligible membership of 115 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Financial Stability Board, Progress since the St. Andrews Meeting in Implementing 
the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability 4 (Apr. 19, 2010), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100419.pdf. 
 43. Press Release, Financial Stability Forum, Financial Stability Forum Re-established 
as the Financial Stability Board (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press 
/pr_090402b.pdf. 
 44. Financial Stability Board, supra note 42, at 11. 
 45. G-20, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, ¶ 15 (Apr. 2 2009), 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf. 
 46. Media Release, Int‘l Org. of Sec. Comm‘ns (―IOSCO‖), IOSCO Completes Global 
Framework to Fight Against Cross-Border Market Abuse (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS176.pdf. 
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securities regulators now meet the requirements needed to become a 
signatory of the MMoU, or have made the necessary commitment to seek 
national legislative changes in order to become eligible in the near future.
47
  
The MMoU provides a mechanism through which securities regulators can 
share essential investigative material while also setting out specific 
requirements for the exchange of information.  The sixty-four full MMoU 
signatories can request and share confidential information in pursuit of 
cross-border securities offenses.  In 2009, IOSCO saw 1261 information 
requests made by its members to fellow regulators via the MMoU, an 
increase from 867 in 2008, a figure that was itself an increase of eighteen 
percent from 2006.
48
  Jane Diplock, Chairman of the IOSCO Executive 
Committee, said at the 2010 Global Financial Crisis Conference:  ―The new 
post-crisis global financial architecture may still be under construction, but 
promising characteristics are already emerging.  Standards are likely to be 
more convergent, and greater enforcement cooperation across jurisdictions 
will leave transgressors with fewer places to hide.‖
49
 
D.  Financial Action Task Force 
The Financial Action Task Force (―FATF‖), an inter-governmental 
body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and 
international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing 
through legislative and regulatory reforms, also responded to the financial 
crisis.
50
  The FATF examined the impact of the crisis on anti-money 
laundering/counter-terrorist financing efforts and reported on the results of 
its study to the G-20 Ministers of Finance in August 2009.  At the G-20 
leaders‘ request, the FATF then publicly identified twenty-eight high-risk 
and non-cooperating jurisdictions in February 2010.
51
  A few months later, 
twenty of these jurisdictions had already provided written high-level 
commitments to address the deficiencies identified.
52
 
 
 47. Id. at 1. 
 48. Id. at 2–3. 
 49. Jane Diplock, Chairman, IOSCO Exec. Comm., Speech at the Global Financial 
Crisis Conference at Bond University, Sydney, Australia:  The Work of IOSCO and the 
Financial Regulatory Framework (Apr. 9, 2010) (on file with author). 
 50. Financial Action Task Force (―FATF‖), Annual Report 2009–2010 (2010), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/50/53/45712700.pdf; see also Paul Vlaanderen, President, 
FATF, Speech to the Association of Banks in Singapore:  Global Threats and Challenges for 
Financial Institutions (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/5/0,3746,en_ 
32250379_32236879_44902085_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 51. FATF Annual Report, supra note 50, at 28–29. 
 52. Id. 
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E.  The Dodd-Frank Act 
The financial crisis also triggered ambitious legislative reform by the 
United States Congress, culminating in the historic Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the ―Dodd-Frank Act‖) being signed 
into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.
53
  Many elements of the 
Dodd-Frank Act attain synergy with the efforts of the G-20 leaders, Basel 
and the FSB, and indicate an intensified acceleration of information 
sharing.
54
  In order to combat fraud, the Dodd-Frank Act includes a 
whistleblower program that provides monetary rewards to employees who 
report securities violations, such as illegal payments to foreign officials.
55
  
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act appends the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 with a new provision, Section 21F:  if someone provides the SEC 
with ―original information‖ regarding any violation of securities laws 
resulting in monetary sanctions over $1 million, the SEC has the discretion 
to award the whistleblower ten to thirty percent of the monetary payment 
collected.
56
  Under the Dodd-Frank Act, whistleblowers could potentially 
receive very large cash rewards, especially when settlements reach the 
billion-dollar range.  On May 25, 2011, the SEC adopted final rules related 
to implementing the whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
scheduled to go into effect on August 12, 2011.
57
  One anticipated result of 
the new whistleblower program may be an increase in the number of 
investigations and prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(the ―FCPA‖), which at the same time raises concerns that corporate 
employees may be tempted to forego their own internal compliance 
programs.
58
 
The Dodd-Frank Act‘s whistleblower program also contemplates 
international cooperation among regulatory authorities.  The whistleblower 
provisions authorize the disclosure of information that could reasonably be 
expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower to foreign securities and 
law enforcement authorities subject to appropriate assurances of 
 
 53. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter ―Dodd-Frank Act‖]. 
 54. Continuing Oversight on International Cooperation to Modernize Financial 
Regulation:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. & Int‘l Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. 
on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 45 (2010) (statement of Daniel K. 
Tarullo, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
 55. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 53, at 1843–49. 
 56. Id. at § 922. 
 57.  See Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545 (May 25, 
2011), available at www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf. 
 58. T. Markus Funk, Meeting (and Exceeding) Our Obligations:  Will OECD‘s Anti-
Bribery Convention Cause the Dodd-Frank Act‘s ‗Whistleblower Bounty‘ Incentives to Go 
Global?, 5 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REPORT 711 (Oct. 8, 2010). 
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confidentiality as determined by the SEC.  The Dodd-Frank Act also 
establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Council (―FSOC‖) to identify 
risks to financial stability, promote market discipline, and respond to any 
emerging threats in the system.
59
  In light of the Dodd-Frank Act‘s impact 
on foreign entities that do business with the United States, SEC Chairman 
Schapiro, while testifying before the Senate Committee on Banking 
regarding the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, said the SEC Office 
of International Affairs was ―consulting bilaterally and through multilateral 
organizations with counterparts abroad, and is meeting bi-weekly with . . . 
[the] rule writing staff [at the SEC] to ensure appropriate coordination with 
our foreign counterparts.‖
60
 
F.  The Volcker Rule 
New U.S. banking regulations after the financial crisis will also test 
the extent of international cooperation.  Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act adopted the ―Volcker 
Rule‖ as new Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act.
61
  As 
proposed by Paul Volcker, former Federal Reserve Chairman who served 
as Chairman of the President‘s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, the 
Volcker Rule is ―particularly designed to deal with the problem of ‗too big 
to fail‘ and the related moral hazard that looms so large as an aftermath of 
the emergency rescues of financial institutions, bank and non-bank, in the 
midst of crises.‖
62
  The Volcker Rule aims to achieve its objective by 
prohibiting any banking entity from engaging in proprietary trading or 
acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest 
in or controlling relationship over, or sponsorship of a hedge fund or a 
 
 59. Financial Stability Oversight Counsel, Financial Stability Oversight Council 
Created Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:  
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Dep‘t of Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ 
Documents/FAQ%20-%20FinancialStabilityOversightCouncilOctober2010FINALv2.pdf; 
see also Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Treasury, Financial Stability Council Holds Inaugural 
Meeting (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg888.aspx. 
 60. Testimony on Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission:  Hearing before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Mary L. 
Schapiro, Chairman, SEC), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2010/ts093010mls.htm. 
 61. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 53, at 1620. 
 62. Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding 
Companies:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th 
Cong. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Prohibiting High-Risk Investment Activities] (statement of Paul 
Volcker, Chairman of President‘s Economic Recovery Advisory Board), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=ec787c5
6-dbd2-4498-bbbd-ddd23b58c1c4. 
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private equity fund.
63
  Aside from the above prohibitions, the Volcker Rule 
also places restrictions on other activities by banking entities, such as 
relationships with private equity funds and hedge funds.
64
 
In 2011, the Volcker Rule continues to move toward implementation.  
On January 18, the FSOC released its report about the Volcker Rule 
entitled ―Study & Recommendation on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading 
& Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds & Private Equity Funds.‖
65
  The 
study responds to the mandate in the Dodd-Frank Act requiring the FSOC 
to study and make recommendations for the implementation of the Dodd-
Frank Act within six months after the Act is enacted.
66
  In the study, the 
FSOC acknowledges the concerns of the financial industry regarding the 
vague areas of the Volcker Rule, particularly the blurry line between 
permitted and prohibited activities.
67
  While the Volcker Rule prohibits 
banking entities from proprietary trading and investment or sponsorship in 
hedge funds and private equity funds, it also provides several exceptions to 
the prohibition.
68
  The FSOC study notably recommends that banking 
entities implement robust compliance programs, including the CEO‘s 
public attestation of the regime‘s effectiveness.
69
  The FSOC also 
acknowledges concerns that the Volcker Rule places U.S. banks at a 
competitive disadvantage, but does not actually address those concerns.
70
 
Meanwhile, the architect of the Volcker Rule is no longer a part of the 
administration, which appears to be seeking closer ties with the business 
sector.
71
  On January 21, 2011, President Obama named Jeffrey R. Immelt 
as Paul Volcker‘s successor as the leader of the President‘s outside panel of 
economic advisers.
72
  The panel has been reconfigured from the Economic 
Recovery Advisory Board into the new Council on Jobs and 
Competitiveness, whose creation reflects the shift of the administration‘s 
 
 63. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (―FSOC‖), STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & 
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS (2011) [hereinafter FSOC REPORT]. 
 64. Id. at 1. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 53, at § 619. 
 67. FSOC REPORT, supra note 63. 
 68. Id. at 1.  The Volcker Rule allows banks to conduct certain trading activities as 
market makers, underwriters, and hedging activities.  The Volcker Rule also allows de 
minimis investment in hedge funds and private equity funds and provides exemptions to the 
prohibition when the banks provide fund investment services to their customers. Id. at 56.  
The precise meaning of ―customer‖ has yet to be defined. 
 69. Id. at 69. 
 70. Id. at 11. 
 71. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Anahad O‘Connor, Obama Picks G.E. Chief for Board as 
Focus Turns to Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/economy/22immelt.html. 
 72. Id.  
KLEHM, MCKOWN & POSNERFINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/26/2011 10:53 AM 
2011] SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT HAS CROSSED THE BORDER 939 
 
economic focus from crisis aversion to job creation.
73
 
Although the implementation of the Volcker Rule will depend on the 
rulemaking of other federal agencies, it has already led to changes or plans 
to change at major banks.
74
  For example, the chief of proprietary trading at 
Morgan Stanley resigned along with sixty employees.
75
  He pledged to 
form a new firm with his team of traders by the end of 2012.
76
  And as 
other countries are unlikely to implement the provisions of the Volcker 
Rule, investment firms such as JPMorgan have commented that European 
investment banks may gain ―material positive earnings potential‖ as a 
result of its implementation.
77
  It is no surprise that the Volcker Rule faces 
fierce opposition from banks and Wall Street firms.  However, according to 
Paul Volcker, the Volcker Rule presents another opportunity for 
international cooperation.  In his statement before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Paul Volcker said: 
[A] strong international consensus on the proposed approach 
would be appropriate, particularly across those few nations 
hosting large multi-national banks and active financial markets.  
The needed consensus remains to be tested.  However, judging 
from what we know and read about the attitude of a number of 
responsible officials and commentators, I believe there are 
substantial grounds to anticipate success as the approach is fully 
understood.
78
 
Without this international cooperation among regulators, the Volcker 
Rule could harm United States banks and other firms. 
Despite the long list of recommendations and the FSOC‘s full support 
for the ―robust implementation‖ of the Volcker Rule, the new FSOC study 
does little to further the implementation of the rule.  Press reports have 
noted that the study is being criticized as largely ―open-ended‖ and too 
deferential to regulators with regard to key decisions.
79
  The task of 
implementing the Volcker Rule has been delegated to the federal agencies 
responsible for designing the rules, which ―have nine months to implement 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, Morgan Stanley Team to Exit in Fallout From Volcker 
Rule, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2011, at C1 (discussing the responses to the Volcker Rule at 
major banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Elisa Martinuzzi, Volcker Rule Favors European Investment Banks, JPMorgan 
Says, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 12, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-12/volcker-
rule-favors-european-investment-banks-jpmorgan-says.html. 
 78. Prohibiting High Risk Investments, supra note 62, at 3. 
 79. Victoria McGrane & Aaron Lucchetti, Oversight Plan Seen to Lack Specifics, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011. 
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detailed regulations for the institutions they oversee.‖
80
  It is still hard to 
say how effective the Volcker Rule will be and how it will complement 
trends toward international cooperation among enforcement authorities. 
G.  Securities and Exchange Commission 
As expected, the SEC also features prominently in the view toward 
cooperation in cross-border securities enforcement.  In November 2008, the 
then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said, ―As the credit crisis has 
unfolded throughout the world during 2008, the SEC has been working 
closely with our international . . . counterparts . . . to coordinate our actions 
and align our strategies.  Nowhere was this more important than in the area 
of enforcement.‖
81
  Cox reported that as of November 2008, the SEC made 
556 requests to foreign regulators for assistance in SEC investigations over 
the year, ―more than one [request] a day on average.‖
82
  He added that 
many of the investigations related to possible wrongdoing in the subprime 
mortgage area.  Reciprocally, the SEC received 454 requests from foreign 
regulators for cooperative law enforcement help in the past year.
83
 
Enforcement in the FCPA area took off for the SEC after 2006, likely as a 
result of the CEO certification required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
84
 and 
increasing globalization.
85
  The SEC brought more cases in the last five 
years than in the twenty-eight years prior to 2005, when the FCPA was 
enacted.
86
  At the 24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practice 
Act in November 2010, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer 
proclaimed that the ―FCPA enforcement is stronger than it‘s ever been—
and getting stronger.‖
87
  The United States Congress has reportedly 
appropriated substantial additional resources in the billions of dollars to the 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the SEC Int‘l Enforcement Institute:  
The Importance of International Enforcement Cooperation in Today‘s Markets (Nov. 7, 
2008). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 745, 806 
(requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify periodic financial reports). 
 85. Since the DOJ created the FCPA unit in 2006, the government has ―collected 
billions of dollars in civil and criminal penalties‖ by prosecuting more cases since 2006 than 
in the first twenty-eight years of the FCPA‘s existence.  Funk, supra note 58, at 3. 
 86. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Response of the United States to Questions 
Concerning Phase 3 OECD Working Group on Bribery 13 (May 3, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3.pdf. 
 87. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks 
at the 24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html [hereinafter 
Breuer FCPA Conference]. 
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US Department of Justice and FBI for the pursuit of white-collar crime 
since 2009.
88
  In January 2011, Breuer discussed some of the steps taken by 
the DOJ to significantly increase its FCPA enforcement capabilities.
89
  For 
example, in the FCPA Unit, the DOJ promoted a new head of the unit and 
two assistant chiefs.
90
  Additionally, Breuer said the DOJ increased the 
number of prosecutors in the FCPA unit, ―attracting high caliber attorneys 
with extensive experience—including Assistant U.S. Attorneys with 
significant trial and prosecutorial experience and attorneys from private 
practice with defense-side knowledge and experience.‖
91
  The SEC has 
similarly been provided with additional resources, including the 2010 
creation of a division dedicated to FCPA enforcement.
92
  In her remarks at 
a news conference in January 2011, Cheryl Scarboro, Chief of the SEC‘s 
new FCPA Unit, vigorously expressed the Enforcement Division‘s 
commitment to work with regulatory authorities around the world ―to level 
the playing field worldwide.‖
93
  She said: 
[T]he FCPA Unit will raise the Commission‘s profile on the 
global stage by playing a more active role in international 
regulatory working groups and building closer relationships with 
our regulatory counterparts in other countries.  Aggressive 
enforcement of the FCPA is essential in a world of increasing 
interdependence . . . .  The [FCPA] Unit will leverage the efforts 
of the SEC, the Department of Justice and our foreign 
counterparts to level the playing field worldwide.  Together we 
will send a clear message that wrongdoers will face a strong and 
united front around the world.
94
 
Similarly, Breuer has noted that by strong enforcement of the FCPA, 
the United States leads by example and demonstrates a strong anti-
corruption program to our foreign counterparts.
95
 
Referring to the progress in securities enforcement made by the 
United States agencies in 2010, Breuer said there has been a substantial 
increase in United States cooperation with our foreign counterparts.  United 
States participation in the OECD review process, for example, has forged 
 
 88. Transparency Int‘l, supra note 33, at 65. 
 89. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att‘y Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep‘t of Justice, 
Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the Washington Area Corporate Counsel 
Association (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-
110126.html. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Transparency Int‘l, supra note 33, at 65. 
 93. Cheryl Scarboro, Chief of the FCPA Unit, SEC, Remarks at News Conference 
Announcing New SEC Leaders in Enforcement Division (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310newsconf.htm#scarboro. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Breuer FCPA Conference, supra note 89. 
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closer relationships between United States and foreign enforcement 
agencies.
96
 
The SEC has also changed its focus in this area and is seeking 
disgorgement, suing individuals and working closely with DOJ and foreign 
regulators.
97
  Moreover, the SEC began entering into enforcement MOUs 
with foreign enforcement authorities such as the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission.
98
  The SEC has recently placed more emphasis 
on enhanced MOUs that go beyond its existing agreements or the IOSCO 
Multilateral MOU.  Now, approximately one third of the SEC‘s insider 
trading and market manipulation cases require the Commission to go 
abroad for the evidence.  The current trajectory continues the trend since 
the insider trading scandals of the 1980s toward greater information sharing 
between the SEC and its foreign counterparts.  Realizing that one needs to 
share information to get information, Congress granted the SEC the 
authority to obtain and share information on behalf of a foreign government 
and to keep information it receives from a foreign government 
confidential.
99
 
In January 2011, press reports indicated that the SEC has been 
investigating whether several banks, hedge funds, and private equity firms 
have run afoul of the FCPA by making improper payments to secure 
investments from sovereign wealth funds.
100
  A placement agent working 
with a sovereign wealth fund may be considered a government official and 
therefore covered by the FCPA.
101
 
Companies that reportedly received letters of inquiry from the SEC 
included Citigroup, The Blackstone Group, Bank of America, and Morgan 
Stanley.
102
  These firms had sought funding from sovereign wealth funds, 
raising billions of dollars in capital to strengthen their balance sheets in 
recent years.
103
  The investigation presumably focuses on whether these 
 
 96. Id.  Breuer explained that the cooperation had yielded results such as the successful 
resolution of the BAE Systems PLC case. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm‘n, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Related to the Enforcement of 
Securities Laws,  (Aug. 25, 2008), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_mututal_recognition/australia/enhanced_enforcem
ent_mou.pdf. 
 99. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 53, at 1843–49. 
 100. Dionne Searcey & Randall Smith, SEC Probes Banks, Buyout Shops Over Dealings 
with Sovereign Funds, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704307404576080403625366100.html. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Joshua Gallu, SEC Probes Financial Firms on Sovereign Fund Bribes, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 14, 2011, 6:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-14/sec-probes-
financial-firms-on-possible-bribes-to-sovereign-wealth-funds.html. 
 103. Peter Lattman & Michael J. De La Merced, S.E.C. Looking Into Deals With 
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entities paid placement agents to win access to the state-owned money, 
with benefits like entertainment and travel.
104
  This would mark the first 
time the SEC has applied the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA to the 
financial services industry.  In light of cross-border regulation and 
increased cooperation between the SEC, the DOJ, and law enforcement and 
regulatory authorities throughout the world, financial firms need to remain 
alert and bolster their FCPA compliance programs because they now face 
increased risk of coordinated international enforcement actions. 
H.  United Kingdom Bribery Act 
In the United Kingdom, the government has recently taken legislative 
action to address the problem of corruption in international business 
transactions.  The United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 (the ―UKBA‖) went 
into effect on July 1, 2011.
105
  The UKBA is much like the FCPA, but it has 
both a broader scope and jurisdictional reach.
106
  It will be relevant to any 
organization that does business in the U.K. or with U.K. counterparties.   
On March 30, 2011, the United Kingdom‘s Ministry of Justice 
(―MoJ‖) published guidance for businesses regarding the proper scope of 
adequate procedures and the extent to which it will exercise prosecutorial 
discretion under the new legislation.
107
  The guidance is based on six 
principles each commercial organization should have, which are ―intended 
to be flexible and outcome focused:‖ (1) proportionate procedures for 
preventing bribery; (2) top-level commitment to preventing bribery; (3) a 
periodic, informed, and documented risk assessment; (4) due diligence 
procedures with a proportionate and risk-based approach; (5) 
communication, including training, that is proportionate to the risks faced; 
and (6) monitoring and review of procedures designated to prevent 
bribery.
108
 
Each principle is followed by commentary and examples.    
The UKBA will likely increase the number of prosecutions and 
investigations originating in the U.K. and also encourage the U.K. Serious 
Fraud Office (―SFO‖) to cooperate in anti-corruption investigations.  
 
Sovereign Funds, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Jan. 13. 2011, 12:08 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/s-e-c-looking-into-deals-with-sovereign-funds. 
 104. Id. 
 105. United Kingdom Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23; see also Michael T. Gass & Anita M. 
Christy, UK Bribery Act:  Corporate Exposure Beyond the FCPA, LAW 360, June 22, 2010, 
http://www.law360.com/web/articles/173718. 
 106. Gass & Christy, supra note 105. 
 107. United Kingdom Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010—Guidance, 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/making-reviewing-law/bribery-act-2010-
guidance.pdf. 
   108.  See id. (NOTE: id. is the UKBA guidance document). 
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Significantly, the UKBA permits the United Kingdom to bring enforcement 
actions against firms and/or conduct outside of the United Kingdom.
109
  
The UKBA extends jurisdiction to any company with a business 
connection to the United Kingdom, regardless of where it is incorporated or 
where the offending conduct occurs.
110
 
Unlike the FCPA, the UKBA reaches wholly private transactions and 
does not create an exception for facilitation payments.  Further, the UKBA 
does not take into account local practice and custom in another country, 
even if it is necessary or customary to make facilitation payments in order 
to do business there.
111
  The UKBA is narrower than the FCPA in one 
respect in that a company with an appropriate compliance program would 
have corporate immunity from liability for failure to prevent bribery as 
long as it maintains ―adequate procedures‖ to prevent bribery.
112
 
III. RECENT, LARGE JOINT SETTLEMENTS AND INCREASED 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
In light of the increasing rhetoric calling for international cooperation 
among regulatory authorities, some settlements have indeed reached into 
the billion-dollar range.  In December 2008, shortly after the Madoff case 
erupted, regulators reached a settlement with Siemens AG (―Siemens‖), a 
manufacturer of industrial and consumer products, that exceeded $1 billion 
in disgorgement and fines—over $1.6 billion, in fact—the largest amount a 
company had ever had to pay to resolve corruption-related charges.
113
  The 
DOJ characterized the Siemens case as ―unprecedented in scale and 
geographic reach.‖
114
  Although it was in part overshadowed by the Madoff 
case and received little press attention at the time, the Siemens settlement 
marked the beginning of a wave of truly enormous FCPA cases.
115
  
 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, Civil Action No. 08 CV 02167 (D.D.C) SEC 
Litig. Release. No. 20829 (Dec. 15, 2008), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm. 
 114. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined 
Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-
1105.html. 
  115.  The largest FCPA settlement to date prior to the Siemens case was Baker Hughes 
$44 million settlement with the DOJ and SEC in 2007.  See, e.g., Peter B. Clark & Jennifer 
A. Suprenant, Siemens—Potential Interplay of FCPA Charges and Mandatory Debarment  
under the Public Procurement Directive of the European Union, Cadwalader Wickersham 
& Taft, 
http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/article/030409ABASiemensPotentialInterplay.pdf. 
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Siemens was charged with violating the FCPA‘s anti-bribery, books and 
records, and internal controls provisions.
116
  It had paid thousands of bribes 
totaling over $1 billion to foreign officials between 2001 and 2007 in order 
to obtain business around the world.
117
  Among the improper payments 
Siemens paid were bribes for opportunities to build metro trains in China, 
national identity cards in Argentina, and medical devices in Vietnam and 
Russia.
118
  The investigation also revealed that Siemens‘ managing board 
was ineffective in ensuring the company complied with U.S. regulatory and 
anti-bribery requirements as well as the constraints imposed by Germany‘s 
adoption of the OECD anti-bribery convention.
119
  The SEC, for example, 
concluded that ―the company‘s tone at the top was inconsistent with an 
effective FCPA compliance program and created a corporate culture in 
which bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the 
company.‖
120
 
The SEC leveraged the prior investigation of German prosecutors and 
conducted a further joint investigation, resulting in a global settlement with 
Siemens.
121
  Together, the SEC, the DOJ, and the Office of the Prosecutor 
General in Munich, Germany, reached a coordinated settlement for 
monetary relief and other remedies.
122
  The U.K. Financial Services 
Authority and the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission also 
cooperated and provided assistance in the investigation.
123
  The SEC 
obtained $350 million in disgorgement penalties for FCPA violations.
124
 
Relatedly, Siemens paid a $450 million criminal fine to the DOJ.
125
  In 
October 2007, Siemens paid a criminal fine of approximately $285 million, 
and in December 2008 the company was ordered to pay an additional $569 
million criminal fine, both to the Office of the Prosecutor General in 
Munich.
126
  Further, under the terms of Siemens‘ plea agreement with the 
DOJ, it had to retain an independent compliance monitor for four years to 
oversee the company‘s implementation of a robust compliance report and 
to report back on the company‘s progress.
127
  Notably, ―the DOJ for the 
first time . . . approved a non-American compliance monitor‖ to handle this 
responsibility—―Dr. Theo Waigel, a German lawyer and the country‘s 
 
 116. SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, supra note 113. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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former Minister of Finance.‖
128
  As part of Siemens‘ integrity initiative 
following the settlement, it launched a ―multi-project anti-corruption 
initiative.‖
129
  Among other projects, it is partnering with the OECD to 
carry out a three-year project to promote business integrity in the Middle 
East and North Africa, holding training sessions and public-private 
conferences there.
130
 
At a press conference announcing the global settlement, the then 
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Friedrich, took the 
opportunity to acknowledge the DOJ‘s significant FCPA enforcement in 
recent years.
131
  He noted that ―[f]rom 2001 to 2004, the Department [of 
Justice] resolved or charged 17 FCPA cases.‖
132
  From 2005 to 2008, 
however, it had resolved forty-two cases, ―representing an increase of more 
than 200 percent within these four years compared to the prior four-year 
period.‖
133
  He added that the ―potentially even more significant‖ aspect of 
the Siemens settlement is ―that the United States is not the only player at 
the table.‖
134
  ―We aren‘t the only ones fighting global corruption,‖ he said.  
―Other nations are joining us in this effort, and I‘m here to tell you that‘s a 
good thing, and something that we will only see more of in the future.‖
135
  
At the same press conference, Linda Chatman Thomsen, then Director of 
the Division of Enforcement at the SEC, said about the Siemens settlement:  
―This marks the first time that United States and foreign prosecutors have 
coordinated their law enforcement efforts as extensively as they have here 
today to address violations of the anti-bribery laws.  I expect it will not be 
the last.‖
136
 
In March 2010, BAE Systems PLC (―BAES‖), a multinational defense 
 
 128. See Alexandra Wrage & Anne Richardson, Siemens AG—Violations of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 48 INT‘L LEGAL MATERIALS 232, 234 (2009) (questioning Mr. 
Waigel‘s qualifications as Siemens‘ monitor). 
 129. Press Release, OECD, Fighting Corruption:  OECD Launches Business Integrity 
Project in Middle East and North Africa (Sept. 12, 2010) 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_46664890_1_1_1_1,00.
html [hereinafter OECD, Fighting Corruption]; see also Siemens Integrity Initiative:  One 
Page Project Profiles Presentation (Dec. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.siemens.com/sustainability/pool/compliance/integrity_ 
initiative/siemens_integrity_initiative_project_profiles_feb_1_2011.pdf (profiling the 
projects funded in the first funding round). 
 130. OECD, Fighting Corruption, supra note 129. 
 131. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference Announcing 
Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Violations (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-opa-
1112.html. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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contractor with headquarters in the United Kingdom and with a U.S. 
subsidiary—BAE Systems Inc.—pleaded guilty to corruption-related 
offenses and agreed to pay $400 million in criminal fines to resolve its 
case, ―one of the largest criminal fines ever levied in the United States 
against a company for business related violations.‖
137
  BAES was charged 
with committing several FCPA violations.  At the outset, BAES 
represented to various government agencies, including the DOJ, that it was 
complying with the FCPA‘s anti-bribery provisions, as well as similar, 
foreign laws relating to the OECD Convention.
138
  In fact, BAES took steps 
to conceal from the U.S. government a series of payments it had made to 
third party intermediaries and shell companies, according to court 
documents.
139
  These payments ―were not subjected to the degree of 
scrutiny . . . to which BAES told the . . . government [they] would be 
subjected.‖
140
 Additionally, beginning in the mid-1980s, BAES served as 
the prime contractor to the U.K. government after the conclusion of a 
formal understanding between the U.K. and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(―KSA‖).
141
  Under the formal understanding and related documents, BAES 
sold aircraft, military hardware, training, and services to the U.K. 
government, which then sold them to KSA.
142
  As such, ―BAES provid[ed] 
substantial benefits to a foreign public official of KSA, who was in a 
position of influence regarding sales of fighter jets, other defense materials 
and related support services.‖
143
  In addition to fines, ―as part of its guilty 
plea, BAES . . . agreed to maintain a compliance program [that would] 
detect and deter [FCPA] violations‖ and other applicable bribery and anti-
corruption laws.
144
  BAES also ―agreed to retain an independent 
compliance monitor for three years [to review] BAES‘s compliance 
program‖ and report back to the company and the DOJ.
145
 
American authorities announced that they benefited greatly from the 
backing of the U.K. SFO in carrying out the BAES investigation.
146
  In a 
statement about the settlement, the DOJ expressed its appreciation for the 
SFO‘s assistance, and ―further expresse[d] its gratitude to that office for its 
 
 137. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to 
Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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ongoing partnership in the fight against overseas corruption.‖
147
  The SFO 
also announced a settlement with BAES.
148
  Unlike the DOJ settlement, 
however, which focused on BAES‘s business dealings in multiple 
countries, ―the SFO settlement concentrate[d] on the company‘s operations 
in Tanzania.‖
149
  Investigations of BAES reportedly continue in Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Switzerland.
150
 
Also in March 2010, the SEC charged Innospec, a specialty chemical 
company, with violating the FCPA by engaging in ―widespread bribery of 
foreign government officials in Iraq and Indonesia to obtain . . . 
business.‖
151
  Specifically, Innospec paid kickbacks to Iraqi officials to 
obtain contracts for the United Nations Oil for Food Program.
152
  It also 
―paid lavish travel and entertainment expenses for Iraqi . . . officials, 
including the seven-day honeymoon of one official,‖ ―mobile phone cards 
and cameras,‖ and ―thousands . . . in cash for ‗pocket money‘‖ to 
officials.
153
  In Indonesia, Innospec ―paid millions of dollars in bribes 
[through an Indonesian agent to continue its chemical sales] to state-owned 
refineries and oil companies.‖
154
  One bribery scheme involved annual 
payments to a senior official at BP Migas, the Executive Agency for 
Upstream Oil and Gas Activity in the Republic of Indonesia.
155
  Another 
scheme involved the payment of ―special commissions‖ into a Swiss 
account, and a third scheme involved a ―one off payment‖ of $300,000.
156
 
Innospec agreed to a $40.2 million global settlement with the SEC, 
DOJ, the U.K.‘s SFO, and the U.S. Treasury Department‘s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control.
157
  The SEC again cooperated with and 
acknowledged the assistance of the U.K. SFO in carrying out the 
investigation.
158
 
In the U.K., Innospec settled with the government after ―plead[ing] 
guilty to bribing employees of Pertamina (an Indonesian state[-]owned 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, BAE Systems PLC (Feb. 5, 2010), 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2010/bae-systems-
plc.aspx. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Transparency Int‘l, supra note 33, at 72. 
 151. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Innospec for Illegal Bribes to Iraqi and 
Indonesian Officials (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-40.htm 
[hereinafter SEC, SEC Charges Innospec]. 
 152. Id. 
 153. SEC v. Innospec, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:10-cv-00448 08 (D.D.C), SEC Litig. 
Release No. 21454 (Mar. 18, 2010). 
 154. SEC, SEC Charges Innospec, supra note 151. 
 155. SEC v. Innospec, supra note 153. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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refinery) and other [Indonesian] [g]overnment [o]fficials‖ in order to secure 
chemical sales agreements there.
159
  The court approved a $12.7 million 
financial penalty on Innospec.
160
  Following the publication of a 2005 
report regarding the United Nations Oil for Food Program, the DOJ started 
to investigate Innospec for both sanctions and corruption offenses.
161
  In 
October 2007, the DOJ referred the investigation to the U.K. SFO.
162
  The 
SFO formally accepted the case for investigation in May 2008, after which 
the company ―disclosed to the SFO evidence that [it] had sought to 
influence [the decisions of Indonesian government officials in public 
contracts]‖ for the purchase of chemicals in Indonesia between 1999 and 
2006.
163
  Notably, this case marked the first time the SFO and DOJ agreed 
to the appointment of a joint monitor to investigate the company‘s FCPA 
compliance program, agreeing that the joint monitor must be acceptable to 
both of them.
164
 
A few months after the Innospec settlement, it became apparent that 
FCPA settlements were continuing to venture into the $1 billion range.  In 
July 2010, the SEC settled with Technip SA, Snamprogetti Netherlands 
BV, KBR, and JGC Corporation, the corporations behind the four-company 
joint venture TSKJ, in a matter where agents of the firms paid bribes to 
Nigerian government officials and corporations over a ten-year period in 
order to win construction contracts worth more than $6 billion.
165
  
Allegedly, ―senior executives at Snamprogetti and the other joint venture 
companies . . . [hired] two agents, a U.K. solicitor and a Japanese trading 
company,‖ who funneled more than $180 million in bribes to Nigerian 
government officials to obtain these construction contracts.
166
  Preceding 
the award of the contracts, the companies met with top-level executive 
branch officials in the Nigerian government to ask for the designation of a 
representative with whom the joint venture could confer regarding bribes to 
government officials.
167
  The SEC also alleged that the U.K. solicitor hired 
 
 159. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Innospec Limited Prosecuted for Corruption 
by the SFO (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-
releases-2010/innospec-limited-prosecuted-for-corruption-by-the-sfo.aspx. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. SEC v. ENI, S.p.A. & Snamprogetti Netherlands, B.V, SEC Litig. Release No. 
21588. (July 7, 2010) http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21588.htm (stating 
that ―ENI and Snamprogetti are the latest to be charged in the decade-long Nigerian bribery 
scheme conducted by a joint venture of companies that also included Technip and KBR Inc. 
. . . . The $365 million to be paid by ENI and Snamprogetti brings the total sanctions against 
the companies involved in the scheme to be more than $1.28 billion . . . .‖). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. Resolves Foreign 
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a subcontractor in Nigeria to transfer millions of dollars to a Nigerian 
government official to benefit a political party in Nigeria.
168
  The 
subcontractor carried the U.S. cash in briefcases and personally delivered it 
to the Nigerian government official.
169
  Some bribes were paid in local 
Nigerian currency as well.  The fines and penalties in the settlement 
exceeded $1.28 billion, with ―Technip, KBR, and its former parent 
Halliburton Company pay[ing] . . . $917 million to settle FCPA charges.‖
170
 
After the settlement, the SEC acknowledged the assistance of foreign 
authorities in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas, in addition to the FBI 
and the Fraud Section of the DOJ‘s Criminal Division.
171
  The DOJ 
acknowledged the ―significant assistance‖ provided by authorities in 
France, Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
172
  Nigeria 
subsequently brought its own charges against Halliburton.
173
  In December 
2010, the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission reached a 
$32.5 million settlement with Halliburton regarding related conduct.
174
  
Regarding the settlement, the FBI Assistant Director involved in the matter 
said, ―We will continue to investigate FCPA matters by working in 
partnership with other law enforcement agencies, both foreign and 
domestic, to ensure that both corporations and executives who bribe foreign 
officials in return for lucrative business contracts are punished.‖
175
  This 
settlement further exemplified the trend toward increased international 
partnerships among regulatory authorities. 
In November 2010, the global logistics services firm Panalpina World 
Transport Holding Ltd. (―Panalpina‖), and several of its clients in the oil 
and gas service industry (including Shell, Transocean, GlobalSantaFe, 
Tidewater, Pride, and Noble) agreed to resolve investigations of overseas 
bribery under the joint efforts of the DOJ and SEC.
176
  Specifically, 
 
Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (July 
7, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-crm-780.html [hereinafter 
Snamprogetti Press Release]. 
 168. SEC v. ENI, supra note 165. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Snamprogetti Press Release, supra note 167. 
 173. Ryan Dezember & Tess Styne, Halliburton To Pay Nigeria $35 Million To Settle 
Bribery Case, WALL ST. J. Dec. 22, 2010, at B4, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703581204576033663462863014.html. 
 174. Id. (stating that the $35 million settlement included $2.5 million for the Nigerian 
government‘s legal fees). 
 175. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Technip S.A. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (June 28, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-crm-751.html. 
 176. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight Forwarding 
Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More than $156 
million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/ 
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Panalpina admitted that it ―engaged in a scheme‖ to bribe ―numerous 
foreign officials on behalf of . . . its customers in the oil and gas industry . . 
. in order to circumvent local rules and regulations‖ regarding the 
importation of goods.
177
  It paid these bribes in at least seven countries, 
including Angola, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia and 
Turkmenistan.
178
  Panalpina‘s customers also admitted that they ―approved 
of . . . the payment of [these] bribes on their behalf in Nigeria and [they 
had] falsely recorded the bribe payments . . . as legitimate business 
expenses in their corporate books [and] records.‖
179
  The companies agreed 
to pay over $156 million in criminal fines and $80 million in civil 
disgorgement, interest and penalties for FCPA violations in numerous 
countries.
180
  Notably, settlements with the SEC and DOJ did not mean the 
end of the matter for offending companies.  The deferred prosecution 
agreements with these companies require the companies ―to fully cooperate 
with U.S. and foreign authorities in any ongoing investigations‖ of the 
companies‘ bribes.
181
  Additionally, each company is ―required to 
implement and adhere to a set of enhanced corporate compliance and 
reporting obligations.‖
182
  The Panalpina settlement is also significant 
because it reflects the use of sweeps to find the violations instead of relying 
on self-reporting by the companies.
183
  An SEC official said that the 
investigation started ―after detecting widespread corruption in the oil 
services industry.‖
184
  In its statement about the settlements, the SEC said 
this settlement with seven companies in the same industry was ―the first 
sweep of a particular industrial sector in order to crack down on public 
companies and third parties who are paying bribes abroad.‖
185
  And 
interestingly, in the DOJ‘s statement regarding the settlement, it recognized 
the companies‘ willingness to cooperate with the investigations and self-
disclose their conduct: 
The corporate resolutions announced today not only hold these 
companies accountable for the criminal conduct set forth in these 
charging instruments and agreements, but they also reflect the 
 
opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html [hereinafter Oil Services Companies Press 
Release]. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and Freight Forwarding 
Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials (Nov. 4, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm. 
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department giving appropriate and meaningful credit to these 
companies to the extent that they have voluntarily self-disclosed 
their conduct and commensurate with the quality and extent of 
their cooperation.
186
 
Relatedly, since January 2010 when the SEC announced its 
Enforcement Cooperation Initiative—―a potential game-changer for the 
Division of Enforcement‖—there has been a trend towards encouraging 
individuals and companies to assist in investigations.
187
  In an 
announcement about the new initiative, the SEC said it ―establishes 
incentives for individuals and companies to fully and truthfully cooperate 
and assist with SEC investigations and enforcement actions.‖
188
  As a 
result, it is easier to determine which companies cooperated most with the 
regulatory authorities based on the lighter sanctions in their settlements. 
The SEC cooperation initiative will likely be used as a way to increase the 
number of cases. 
Cross-border regulatory cooperation can also be seen in the 2010 
announcement by the technology firm Hewlett-Packard that American and 
foreign authorities have been probing its deals in several countries, 
including Russia and the former Soviet Republic.
189
  It had previously been 
announced that German authorities were investigating matters involving 
Hewlett-Packard‘s dealings in Russia and former Soviet Republics.
190
  
Specifically, there were allegations that Hewlett-Packard executives made 
bribes to win a contract to sell computer gear, through a German 
subsidiary, to the office of the prosecutor general of the Russian 
Federation.
191
  In December 2010, Hewlett-Packard suggested that the 
investigation had expanded when it announced that U.S. authorities were 
looking at whether Hewlett-Packard employees in Russia, Germany, 
Austria, Serbia, or the Netherlands had paid kickbacks to the company‘s 
distributors and customers.
192
 
The expansiveness of the regulatory cooperation can be seen in this 
matter.  At the request of German prosecutors, Russian investigators 
obtained a ―large crate of evidence‖ from Hewlett Packard‘s offices there, 
 
 186. Oil Services Companies Press Release, supra note 176. 
 187. Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage Individuals and 
Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm. 
 188. Id. 
 189.  Ben Worthen & David Crawford, H-P Says Probe Has Expanded, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 17, 2010, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703395204576023810621129214.html.  
 190. Hewlett-Packard Co. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 145 (Dec. 15, 2010) 
[hereinafter HP Form 10-K]. 
 191. Worthen & Crawford, supra note 189. 
 192. Id.; see also HP Form 10-K, supra note 190. 
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and shared it with German investigators.
193
  According to press reports, 
questions have been raised as to whether senior Hewlett-Packard officials 
hired agents to launder money to pay bribes through sham companies.
194
  
Additionally, German prosecutors have shared the evidence related to the 
German investigation with the DOJ and SEC.
195
  As of December 2010, 
U.S. officials had traveled to Germany twice in connection with the 
investigation.
196
 
Regulators are outspoken in their understanding that the increase in 
cooperation between foreign authorities in the post-financial crisis climate 
will be crucial to the FCPA‘s continued success.  Parallel and cooperative 
enforcement actions in other jurisdictions regarding the same conduct at 
issue in a United States ―FCPA prosecution is expected to become a new 
norm.‖
197
  Still, American businesses have expressed concerns that the 
strong enforcement of the FCPA creates an uneven playing field for them 
internationally, particularly in the current difficult economic climate.  At a 
recent Senate hearing, such concerns were addressed with the United States 
enforcement authorities, along with a desire for clearer guidelines on how 
companies can comply with the FCPA.
198
 
Cooperation among foreign regulators can be seen outside the FCPA 
area in only a few instances.  In March 2009, at the request of regulators 
investigating an alleged $8 billion fraud, a federal judge in the United 
States ―extended a freeze on millions of dollars held in Stanford Group Co. 
accounts.‖
199
  One month later, a judge at the High Court in the U.K. froze 
more than $100 million worth of assets belonging to Stanford International 
Bank by extending a freezing order covering cash, shares and investments 
held in bank accounts at Credit Suisse and HSBC branches in the U.K.
200
 
 
 193. Worthen & Crawford, supra note 189; see also Transparency Int‘l,  supra note 33 
(discussing German and Russian cooperation in the investigation). 
 194. Worthen & Crawford, supra note 189. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its 
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 416–17 (2009–2010). 
 198. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010), 
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/296805-1. 
 199. SEC v. Stanford Int‘l Bank, 3:2009-cv-00298 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2009) (order 
granting freeze of Stanford assets, also providing for extensions in the future); see also 
Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Stanford Judge Extends Freeze on Investor Accounts, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 2, 2009), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aE5ab4lw0Hvo (discussing 
the asset freeze in connection with the Stanford fraud case). 
 200. Meghan Murphy, High Court Judge Extends Freeze on Stanford Assets, FIN. TIMES, 
Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4f13ad00-230b-11de-9c99-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1URypu9vX. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Trends after the financial crisis show that regulators have almost 
universally announced that they intend to further focus their policies and 
procedures toward increased international cooperation in the area of 
enforcement.  Time will tell whether these proclamations will materialize.  
One pressing question is to what extent the level of cooperation in FCPA 
investigations will take place outside of the FCPA arena.  This type of 
cooperation has not been witnessed in the fields of insider trading and 
market manipulation.  Strides have been made in international freeze orders 
(notably in the Stanford case) but there remain few examples of this level 
of cooperation. 
In any event, multinational corporations should continue to stay 
attentive to anti-bribery and corruption investigations and inquiries.  In the 
current climate, with much discussion regarding increased regulation and 
scrutiny of corporate business practices, a corporation‘s robust internal 
compliance policies and procedures are more vital than ever.  With 
regulatory authorities speaking out for cooperation with each other in 
enforcement investigations, there is a greater likelihood that investigations 
will increasingly cross jurisdictional boundaries and result in hefty global 
joint settlements among regulators worldwide. 
 
 
 
 
